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TAX REFORM - AN APPRAISAL
By R. D. BROWN, F.C.A., AND R. J. DART, C.A.*
Tax reform has now been around long enough to make it as familiar as
a pair of old shoes, although perhaps not quite as comfortable. The two years
that have passed since the introduction of the new Income Tax Act in Canada
present sufficient perspective for us to attempt an appraisal of the new income
tax system, albeit strictly from the viewpoint of tax practitioners, but with a
few philosophical afterthoughts thrown in for good measure.
When the Conservative government decided in 1962 to review and
reform our tax legislation, few disagreed with the decision to appoint a Royal
Commission to first undertake a thorough examination of the Canadian tax
system. At that time, only those who are most familiar with the habits of
Royal Commissions and Canadian political processes would have speculated
that the projected overhaul of the tax system would take over ten years to
only partially complete, involving a Royal Commission report of six volumes,
a comprehensive White Paper issued by the Minister of Finance, Bill C-259
containing 500 pages of detailed tax legislation (most of it bearing little
resemblance to what had preceded) and uncounted tons of submissions,
studies, arguments and just plain cries of anguish.
Not surprisingly, Bill C-259 containing the new Income Tax Act passed
by Parliament at the end of 1971, clearly is not the end of the tax reform
process. Successive amendments to the Income Tax Act have already intro-
duced over 300 changes to the legislation originally passed at the end of 1971,
and hundreds more may be expected over the next several years to correct
anomalies, block loopholes, and generally smooth away the rough edges of
the new income tax provisions. Tax reform, once begun, is clearly a never
ending process involving a continuous series of refinements.
Why tax reform?
Before attempting to appraise what the new income tax legislation has
and has not done for Canadians, it is appropriate to consider the reasons
which led, back in 1962, to the appointment of the Royal Commission under
the late Kenneth Carter to review the Canadian tax system. There were a
number of controversial areas in the income tax system which created con-
tinuous friction between taxpayers and the revenue authorities, due to the
fact that the legislation contained many uncertainties and had not kept up
to date with Canada's burgeoning commercial development.
The lack of any clearly defined demarkation between fully taxable
income from an adventure in the nature of trade, and the completely tax
free capital gain appeared to be a never ending source of argument and
litigation. In other areas, the taxpayers were clearly managing to get the best
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of the Revenue through schemes to remove the surplus of corporations with-
out the normal incidence of taxation: a variety of anti-avoidance provisions,
beginning with designated surplus in 1950 and culminating with ministerial
discretion in 1963, were designed to block dividend stripping and other tax
gimmicks which swept Canada during the 1950's and early 1960's.
On the one hand, taxpayers were arbitrarily denied any deduction for
certain legitimate business expenditures - "nothings", while in other areas the
overly enthusiastic response of taxpayers to certain incentives, such as the
new mine exemption and the lower rate of tax on unassociated corporations,
tended to erode the tax base. There were sharp distinctions in the total
amount of tax imposed on essentially the same type of income flowing to tax-
payers through different channels (such as directly or through a corporation)
and a whole host of niggling unfairnesses and loopholes littered an Income
Tax Act that was overdue for revision.
Now that the dust of the ten year battle over tax reform has settled,
it is surprising to see how few of these issues tax reform has finally laid to rest.
Virtually all of the serious problems recognized in the income tax struc-
ture in 1962 remain under the new provisions, not as a result of any deliberate
perversity on the part of the government, but because the political processes
in Canada and the realities of an ever more complex business world simply
do not admit of simple solutions to these complex problems.
The main product of tax reform was the inclusion of one half of realized
capital gains in the tax base. The continued distinction between capital gains
and ordinary income has meant that the arguments as to the treatment of
borderline items continue unabated, although eventually the fight may be
slightly less heated because the difference between tax at full rates and half
rates is less marked under the new system than the difference between full
tax and no tax under the old rules. Further, many of the complexities in the
new Income Tax Act arise because Parliament quite properly did not seek
to tax capital gains on a retroactive basis. To avoid the retroactive feature
required a concept of a "Valuation Day" at the start of the new system; to
avoid taxing the recovery of cost in those cases where assets acquired prior
to 1972 were worth less than their cost on Valuation Day, the tax free zone
concept was introduced. (The attempt to be fair in this area has made the
tax rules regarding the adjusted cost base of a partnership interest almost
incomprehensible.) Here, as elsewhere, the attempt to preserve equity in an
Act which contains no clear cut philosophy of taxation leads to ever more
complex tax rules.
Equity - vertical, horizontal, and diagonal:
One of the moving forces behind the entire tax reform process in Can-
ada that started way back with the Carter Commission and continues today
is the search for more "equity" in taxation - the just tax system in which
everyone would pay his "fair share". The Carter Report was itself deeply
concerned with horizontal equity - the concept that individuals in equal
economic positions should pay equal tax - and vertical equity, meaning that
individuals in different economic positions should pay an "appropriately"
different amount of tax.
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But if the lengthy debate about tax reform has shown anything, it has
revealed that Canadians by and large are not so much attracted to elegant
economic theories of fairness as they are to the simple question of how much
tax they will be required to pay. Whenever the answer turns out to be "more",
the objections are immediate and vociferous, regardless of the justification.
The Carter Report was attacked by a wide variety of interests, including
such diverse groups as mining companies, farmers, cooperatives, and small
businesses, as dealing unfairly with their own particular positions, i.e. the
Report proposed to remove some of the preferences which these groups en-
joyed. The diverse nature of the Canadian nation was reflected in the political
pressures which these groups generated, pressures which ultimately destroyed
the symmetry of the Carter package and led to the adoption of a tax reform
program which was really not so much a brilliant new approach to taxation,
but rather a refurbishing of the old system made somewhat more effective and
considerably more complex, with a capital gains tax grafted on top. The tax
reform amendments were a typically Canadian solution to a series of difficult
philosophical and practical problems - they were a compromise between
many conflicting points of view; they made no one particularly happy, but
avoided making any large group extremely unhappy.
Play it again Sam, the Old Way
Many people, when commenting on the provisions of the new Act, refer
to their undoubted complexity, the unfamiliarity of the approach, and the
general newness of the many difficult problems which they have raised for tax
practitioner and taxpayer alike. But it is remarkable upon reviewing these
problems to see how many of them have their roots in the old Act, and have
been continued, albeit in altered form, in the new provisions.
Back in the days of the Carter Report and the Great Debate on Tax
Reform, it was generally expected that the introduction of a tax on capital
gains would remove the need for all of the complex paraphernalia of the
Income Tax Act designed to prevent the distribution of corporate surplus as
capital gains.
The rules on designated surplus, and ministerial discretion to stop
dividend stripping provided under Section 138A and other special provi-
sions are all examples of the approach taken under the older legislation to
prevent taxpayers from converting what would have been taxable dividend
income into tax free capital gains.
The introduction of a tax on capital gains accruing after 1971 and the
revised rules for the taxation of dividend income have sharply narrowed the
spread between the tax rate on these two different types of income. Capital
gains received by individuals are now taxed at a maximum tax rate of 31%
(in Ontario) while the corresponding maximum tax on dividend distributions
would be about 47%. (Under the old Act the rate of tax on capital gains
was zero, and the maximum tax rate on dividend income was about 60%.)
Despite the much lower tax differential, the policy decision seems to
have been that it is absolutely necessary to maintain the distinction between
the capital gains and income arising on the distribution of corporate surplus.
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The reasoning behind this may be challenged, as this distinction is really only
applicable to shareholders of private corporations: shareholders of public
companies realize their share of the undistributed income of their corpora-
tions at capital gains rates quite readily, by simply selling the shares in the
marketplace. However, the new Act contains reinvigorated provisions relating
to designated surplus of almost unbelievable complexity, designed to ensure
that taxpayers will not be able to escape paying tax on distributions from
corporate surplus; and the only change made in the often criticized ministerial
discretion provisions of Section 138A has been to renumber the Section.
The retention of these provisions in the new Act, at least beyond their
application to surpluses accumulated to the end of 1971, is unfortunate for a
number of reasons. The rules with respect to designated surplus will not in
fact enable the government to collect any significant amount of tax: rather,
what they will do is to prevent businesses from organizing their affairs in the
most efficient way. Furthermore, the plug of the designated surplus is several
times as large as the loophole that it was designed to cover, with the result
that the designated surplus rules will hamper corporate distributions and re-
organizations which in no sense involve any real distribution of corporate
income.
This is an example of an area where the tax reform measures, far from
solving difficult policy questions, have in fact made existing problems worse
by making previous restrictions more effective.
Business reorganizations - what went wrong?
The new Act makes it abundantly clear that taxation is the almost
invariable rule and a tax free "rollover" is a highly circumscribed exception.
Gain or loss must now be recognized on all transfers of assets between non-
arm's length parties - even transfers involving no real change in economic
ownership - unless the transfer fits one of the relatively few and narrow
exemptions.
Where Canadians in the past took for granted that they could transfer
assets between companies within a related group, they now meet potential
tax on recaptured depreciation, the value of goodwill, and the increase in
value of capital assets from their value on Valuation Day. Taxpayers are
required to fit any tax free "rollover" transaction within prescribed re-
organization rules which suffer more bugs than the average family car.
Unfortunately, the government has not seen fit to adopt the recall procedures
of the major auto companies.
Business reorganizations and mergers are of course the subject of intense
interest to lawyers and accountants practising in the taxation field, and it is
in this area that the new income tax rules have come in for some of the
heaviest criticism. Both the underlying spirit and the execution of the business
reorganization rules of the new Act seem to reflect an uncomfortable narrow-
ness of approach.
For example, the liquidation of a wholly owned subsidiary into its parent
company appears to be a simple enough transaction, and one which should
clearly qualify for a "tax free" reorganization - 4 postponement of any rec-
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ognition of gain or loss - since there has been no change of economic owner-
ship of the subsidiary's assets. A "rollover" is in fact provided under Section
88(1) for such a transaction. Yet, two years after these rules were enacted
that Section still arbitrarily and inexplicably required a liquidating subsidiary
to pay tax on any of its reserve accounts (such as its allowance for doubt-
ful accounts and reserve for uncollected instalment sales) without allowing
the parent any corresponding deduction. (The May, 1974 budget proposals
would, if adopted, remove this particular problem.)
Another example of a rather inexplicable awkwardness in the case of
the liquidation of a wholly owned subsidiary arises in respect of the flow of
the subsidiary's 1971 surplus balances to the parent company. In theory,
if the liquidation is to be treated as a "tax free" reorganization, the 1971
surpluses of the subsidiary should be transferred intact to the parent, so that
the winding up of the subsidiary will have no net tax consequences on the
organization.
However, the actual provisions of Section 88 require that, to achieve
this transfer of surplus accounts, the subsidiary corporation must first pay
15% tax on all of its 1971 undistributed income and file the proper election
forms in order to transfer the 1971 surplus balances to the parent.
A strict technical interpretation of Sections 88(2) and 83(1) suggests
that even then the transfer is only effective provided the subsidiary deter-
mines to the dollar the exact balance in these accounts. Such an exact deter-
mination will in most instances be completely impracticable since the balances
depend upon many factors including the value of capital assets on Valuation
Day. (Fortunately, the Technical Interpretations Division has advised that
the Department will accept a Section 83 election to be valid when subsequent
adjustments are made to the surplus balances.)
Having followed through the proper steps, the parent may then wait
for a year for a refund of the 15% tax paid by the subsidiary on its 1971
undistributed income, provided the parent meets a number of specific rules
in Section 196(2). These steps, with their attendant difficulty, complexity
and expense, are required to merely liquidate a subsidiary into its parent
without any tax advantage to the business concerned. (Again, the federal
budget resolutions of May 1974 would, if enacted, solve many of these
difficulties.)
A third "rollover" provision (Section 85(1)) allows the "tax free"
transfer of assets to a corporation in which the transferor holds 80% or more
of each class of stock. However, these rules too have their pitfalls for the
unwary. Section 85 is designed to permit an individual to incorporate his
business on a "tax free" basis, i.e. without having to recognize any immediate
gain on the transfer of the assets to a company owned by him. However, the
rollover is only available in respect of capital assets (including depreciable
property), eligible capital property, and certain resource properties. No
"rollover" is available with respect to such a common business asset as in-
ventory. (The'May, 1974 budget resolutions would extend the categories of
assets which can be "rolled into" a corporation, as well as remove the "80%"
requirement) Further, while a taxpayer may transfer capital assets into a con-
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trolled corporation under Section 85(1) he may not also transfer any re-
serves in respect of uncollected proceeds or other items which relate to the
assets being transferred.
Again, the narrowness of the "rollover" rules is in practice made even
more serious by nagging anomalies that can prevent even the apparently
limited "rollover" from giving the taxpayer the intended relief. While the
"rollover" rules under Section 85 are clearly designed to allow a taxpayer to
transfer depreciable property to his company on a "tax free" basis, the precise
wording is such as to often deny the "tax free rollover" where the taxpayer
transfers more than one depreciable asset in a class at the same time.
Further, the election to transfer property into a corporation under Section
85 is only available where the transferor owns at least 80% of each class of
stock of the corporation. General Motors of Canada can transfer all of its
capital assets to a newly formed subsidiary but two small businessmen who
would like to form a jointly owned company to carry on their two separate
businesses will find that they are denied a rollover, since the transfer from
each of them will not be to a corporation in which each will own 80% of
the outstanding shares. The two persons could attempt to circumvent this
rule if they wish - and if they have knowledgeable tax advisers - by having
each person transfer his business assets to a wholly owned corporation, then
amalgamate the two corporations on a "tax free" basis (provided that the
corporations are not too dissimilar in size).
Again, to achieve a reasonable result, the businessman has been forced
into adopting a complex and costly arrangement for a simple business trans-
action. Even with all of this work, they may still not have achieved their goal:
if the taxation authorities consider that the incorporation of separate cor-
porations followed by a subsequent amalgamation is an "artificial" circum-
vention of the restriction that a rollover is only available to an 80% owned
corporation, then the transaction could conceivably be attacked as a tax
avoidance program.
Precise rules destroy flexibility
An unfortunate feature of the new Act is the greater reliance on specific
rules. It was inevitable that the general principles of taxation of former years
would give way to the realities of the complex world in which we today live.
Nevertheless, a very legitimate criticism of the new Act is that it has been
drafted with too many specific rules which appear designed to combat tax
avoidance and artificial tax minimization schemes rather than trying to ac-
commodate itself to the realities of economic life.
The Act appears to assume that taxpayers are highly sophisticated per-
sons, or at least have the advice of sophisticated tax advisers. It appears more
concerned with preventing these high-priced experts from avoiding tax for
their clients than to serve the needs of Canadian businessmen in Moose Jaw
or in Richmond Hill.
For example, the new Act contains quite commendable rules which
permit corporations to distribute 1971 surplus balances to their shareholders
in the form of special "tax free" dividends after the payment of 15% tax on
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the 1971 undistributed income content. Unfortunately, the new provisions
require the corporation to make certain elections, in prescribed form, and
within strict time periods.
The directors of the company must first pass a resolution electing to
pay tax on 1971 undistributed income, and file that election along with the
payment of tax. The payment of tax must accompany the form or the election
is invalid. The directors must then declare the dividend out of the 1971 sur-
plus accounts, again in prescribed manner and form. Following this, the cor-
poration must file the Section 83 (1) election form before paying the dividend.
It is not surprising that taxpayers have become confused with these
procedures, especially since many other tax forms or elections may be filed
up to six months after the year end. The Department of National Revenue
is now evidently deluged with situations where corporations have not fol-
lowed the appropriate manner of electing to pay the tax and distribute the
surplus, and therefore face a penalty tax of 100%.
The small businessman who wishes to take advantage of the rules by
which Parliament clearly intended that he be permitted to receive the surplus
in his corporation at a 15% tax cost is faced with being required to complete
a maze of elections, motions, and form filings in a very precise manner and
order. The Government has simply over-estimated the ability of Canadian
taxpayers and their advisers to cope with the complexities of this 1971 surplus
distribution system. Why could not Parliament have adopted a somewhat
simpler route whereby a corporation merely declares a "tax free" dividend
out of its 1971 capital surplus balances? A simple directors' resolution
authorizing such dividend and the subsequent filing of a form within, say,
three to six months together with the payment of 15% tax to the extent that
the dividend came out of 1971 undistributed income would seem sufficient.
Interest could be required dating from the date of the dividend payment with
the form itself to be filed within, say, six months. Furthermore, if the total
tax free dividend declared by a corporation exceeded its 1971 surplus bal-
ances, surely in lieu of a 100% penalty tax, the Act could have given an
escape route whereby the shareholders of the corporation would elect to treat
the excess as a taxable dividend in their hands.
Of course, the provisions regarding the distribution of tax free dividends
are not the only part of the Act to contain overly harsh and specific rules.
For example, where control of a corporation changes hands, the Act provides
that any capital loss carry forward expires immediately. This would seem
reasonable in order to avoid obvious trading in loss companies but the
harshness of the rule becomes obvious when one contemplates a change of
control occurring on the sudden death of a major shareholder. In any event,
why don't the rules permit loss carryovers at the date of change of control
to be used to reduce capital gains in respect of capital assets in the corpora-
tion at the time control changed hands or at least with respect to unrealized
capital gains at that date?
One should not overlook the fact that specific rules also existed in the
former Act which created the potential for harsh treatment of the taxpayer.
However, taxpayers tended to overlook certain technical problems in the
1974]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
old Act because it was generally accepted that the Department of National
Revenue would assess on a basis which was reasonable to all concerned. For
example, no rule existed to prescribe the basis of depreciable property trans-
ferred on the liquidation of a corporation, and yet for years everyone - in-
cluding the taxation authorities - would act on the basis that such assets
were transferred at their net value as accepted for tax purposes. However,
the new income tax rules, with a host of highly arbitrary and specific provi-
sions, have made such informal accommodations between taxpayers and
revenue authorities much more difficult.
Better taxes - or more taxes
Back in 1962, when the Carter Commission was first established, the
revenues of all governments in Canada took about 29 % of the Gross National
Product. In 1973, following the implementation of income tax reform, the
share of GNP taken by governments had increased to 38%. Tax reform
therefore helped to achieve at least one important result: if it did not give
us a simpler or a better taxation system, at least it gave us more taxes.
A good part of the increase in government revenues over this 11 year
period did not come because of increases in tax rates, but rather from the
almost incredible buoyancy of personal income tax revenues. Inflation over
this period has increased money incomes far faster than real incomes, push-
ing individuals into higher tax brackets and causing personal exemptions to
represent a smaller proportion of total incomes. This has enabled the federal
and provincial governments, who both share the personal tax field in Canada,
to reap a bonanza of additional personal income tax revenues without having
to actually change tax rates.
It appears that income tax reform measures have likely increased, at
least slightly, the elasticity of the personal income tax system, resulting in
more revenues to federal and provincial governments since the end of 1971.
This factor, combined with the rapid inflation of the last year or so, has
contributed to the growing predominance of the personal income tax in
government revenues.
In view of this, the about-face of Finance Minister Turner in adopt-
ing Robert Stanfield's proposal for the indexing of the personal income tax
system is perhaps not as surprising as it might first appear. The adjust-
ment of income tax brackets and exemptions to automatically take account
of the effects of inflation will slow down but not stop the increase in govern-
ment revenues resulting from inflationary trends. It will also force both federal
and provincial governments to justify further increases in personal income
taxes rather than reaping them automatically through the influence of inflation.
The indexing of the personal income tax structure is one of the most
significant - perhaps the most significant - change that the entire tax reform
process has brought to Canada, although this proposal was enacted after the
tax reform package itself.
The other shoe
Despite the fact that the income tax amendments passed at the end of
1971 were supposed to represent a comprehensive attempt to adjust the entire
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income tax -structure, the fact remains that more and more tax reform is
being looked upon as an on-going and never ending process. In the first place,
despite many amendments to the Income Tax Act to correct technical defects
and problems, many more changes will be required to put the Act in shape
and to block loopholes and correct anomalies. Further, even though the Act
has been in effect for only a little over two years, it is already beginning to
show signs of wear around the edges: the international proposals clearly
need a major overhaul even before they become fully effective. It is quite
likely that the natural resource area, particularly oil and gas, will see some
major changes arising out of the current energy crisis, and policy decisions
on such diverse matters as corporate reorganizations, capital cost allowances
and retirement income will have to be thought through again within the next
year or so.
Moving outside of the income tax area, the comments of the Carter
Report on other areas of taxation, such as sales and excise taxes, remain
largely unreviewed.
It is likely that over the next three or four years, there may be major
revisions in other government revenue fields at the federal level; and of course
the provinces, always short of cash, are also overhauling their tax systems
with the main idea to collect more from the public by one means or another.
The rate of change in the taxation system has accelerated from virtually
a snail's pace in the 1950's and early 1960's to a bewildering and rapid series
of changes occurring at all levels of government in Canada, and shows no
sign of slowing down. Tax reform has become institutionalized.
Corporate rip-off or rape?
The Carter Report assumed that the taxation system was not a par-
ticularly valuable tool to promote economic growth. Rather the Report as-
sumed that a neutral tax system - a tax system which did not actively retard
investment or discriminate against particular types of economic activity -
would provide a favourable environment for economic activity. However, as
many critics of the Carter Report pointed out, it is only appropriate for a
taxation system to be neutral in a neutral world, and the realities of Canadian
life are that our economic system must respond to the competition and
stimulus of other economies. Further, there are many non-neutralities in our
society which are caused by other than income tax factors - tariffs, provin-
cial restrictions on trade, monopolies, and labour unions are only a few of
the items that might be cited.
One of the major defects in the Carter Report which was unfortunately
carried through to the new tax system evolving out of it is the lack of any
comprehensive analysis of the relative tax position of Canadian business. The
Carter Report recognized that our total tax system - not merely the income
tax - might well have a somewhat unfortunate effect upon the ability of
Canadian industry to compete at home and abroad. Unfortunately, this rec-
ognition was not carried through with any penetrating analysis to discern
just what the comparative position of Canadian industry might be and just
what effect the total tax system had on economic development in Canada.
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An analysis of the total burden of the Canadian tax system on Cana-
dian industry and commerce shows that Canada has developed a peculiar and
highly biased approach to the taxation of industrial effort in this country. In
fact, Canadian governments collect a relatively onerous corporate income
tax by international standards, and as well impose an unexpectedly heavy
hidden burden of sales taxes, capital taxes, realty taxes and other miscel-
laneous imposts on Canadian business activities.
There is evidence that the overall tax structure in Canada imposes a
heavy tax burden upon Canadian business activities - a burden significantly
heavier than that imposed on corresponding businesses in other countries.
Furthermore, a large part of the Canadian tax component of business costs is
fixed and unresponsive to changes in the business cycle, resulting in a con-
siderable drag on the profitability and flexibility of Canadian business activity.
Far from Canadian businesses being in a position to "rip off" the Cana-
dian Treasury, there is some evidence that Canadian businesses are amongst
the most heavily taxed in the world, when the effects of all aspects of our
taxation system are taken into account. This is not a statement that can be
easily proved or disproved - measurements in this area depend on the criteria
and assumptions selected. However, it seems clear that this aspect of the Cana-
dian tax system has not received the attention which it deserves, either during
the Carter Report days or subsequently.
Tax reform - too slow, or too fast?
If tax reform had been introduced gradually, taxpayers would have had
time to digest the reforms and the government would have had an oppor-
tunity to profit from the inevitable mistakes.
The federal government has learned from the tax reform debacle, but
perhaps not enough. We are still following a basically outmoded budget sys-
tem where tax changes are prepared in secret by a small group of persons
working in the Tax Policy Branch of the Department of Finance, and are
then sprung on the country on budget night with the hope that the amend-
ments will be clear, and that all possible difficulties have been forseen. The
problem does not lie with the civil servants working in the Tax Policy
Branches of the Departments of Finance and National Revenue. (These people
are, on the whole, an extraordinarily dedicated group - by and large they
are more intelligent and able than most of their critics.) Rather, the problem
is with the system itself.
The government and the Canadian public may learn that in taxation as
in other areas of human affairs, the change which frequently sticks the longest
and does the most is the change that is carried out gradually with the co-
operation and consultation of those affected.
We all know the difficulties and complexities, the agonies, the incredible
intricacies that have been foisted upon us with tax reform in Canada over the
past three years. In our view, these difficulties could have been made much
less serious if the government, instead of bringing in tax reform like the
millennium in June of 1971, had instead embarked on a series of changes to
the Income Tax Act, beginning back in 1963. Some of the amendments which
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were announced with so much fanfare in 1971 were, in fact, long overdue in
1963; most of the problems were recognized and many of the solutions were
apparent.
We operate in Canada under the myth that to involve taxpayers in
commenting on the detailed provisions of tax legislation in advance of their
introduction would be somehow immoral. Tradition states that all tax changes
- no matter how technical - must be first announced in the House of
Commons, in order to preserve sovereignty of Parliament. Yet can members
of Parliament realistically be expected to understand the technical amend-
ments? They have neither the time nor the ability to criticize government tax
proposals except in their broadest outline. Their function is one of setting
broad policy guidelines.
We further have the fiction that the government seems to stand or fall
on whether a comma is or is not removed from some technical amendment,
with the consequent result that the government has little flexibility in reacting
to taxpayer comment in the brief period between the introduction of legisla-
tion into the House of Commons and its passage into law.
Put all of this together - the outmoded ideas of budgetary secrecy, the
myths of the supremacy of Parliament with respect to technical amendments
it doesn't understand, and the inflexibility of the procedures for adopting tax
changes - and we have put the process of developing new tax policies into
a strait jacket. Improvements in the way in which we approach the difficult
problem of continuously revising our tax system to keep it equitable and in
line with economic requirements must await changes in the way in which
we go about bringing forward tax amendments.
This issue was one of the major points made in the 1972 and 1973
briefs of the Joint Committee on Taxation of The Canadian Bar Association
and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. The Joint Committee
argued in these submissions that greater taxpayer involvement in the tax
change process and greater openness in the process of revising tax amend-
ments was an essential prerequisite to coping with the technical problems and
complexities of our "reformed" tax system.
The other side of the coin
Our appraisal of income tax reform in this article has been, in the main,
of a critical nature; but it is not appropriate to end the review with such a
one-sided comment. The pressures which led to the appointment of the Royal
Commission on Taxation in the first instance and the subsequent revision of
our income tax system were deeply rooted in the belief of most Canadians
that our previous tax system could and should be made more equitable. To
a significant extent, the pressure for tax reform was not merely the desire to
improve the technical provisions of the Act so as to satisfy tax practitioners,
but a much more deep-seated feeling that the heavy and increasing burden
of taxation in Canada should be shared on the fairest possible basis.
To a degree, this desire has been fulfilled in the new Income Tax Act.
The tax base has been broadened to include capital gains and a number of
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other previously untaxed items; deductions have been made more compre-
hensive and the fairness of the whole system significantly improved. Given
the diverse nature of our country and its various pressure groups, it was not
possible to adopt a single coherent and comprehensive approach to the
sharing of tax burdens, so that special rules for special circumstances, com-
promises, and just plain indecision continue to pepper the Act. But the move-
ment on the whole was definitely in the right direction: it remains for us all
to recognize that the process of tax reform has not been completed and
that substantial improvements in the way in which our tax burden is allocated
are not only possible but necessary.
